State of Utah, Layton City v. Ronald Charles Barton : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
State of Utah, Layton City v. Ronald Charles Barton
: Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald Barton, Pro se.
Clinton R. Drake; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Layton City v. Barton, No. 20080754 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1149
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
APPELLATE CASE # 20080754 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through, 
LAYTON CITY, a municipal corporation 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
RONALD CHARLES BARTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Second District Court, State of Utah, Layton Department 
Judge David Connors 
District Court Case # 085603119 
Ttonald Barton, Pro Se 
340 West 100 North 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Defendant and Appellant 
Clinton R. Drake 
Layton City Attorney's Office 
437 North Wasatch Drive 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB 0 4 2009 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
APPELLATE CASE # 20080754 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through, 
LAYTON CITY, a municipal corporation 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
RONALD CHARLES BARTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Second District Court, State of Utah, Layton Department 
Judge David Connors 
District Court Case # 085603119 
Clinton R. Drake (11155) 
Layton City Attorney's Office 
437 N. Wasatch Dr., Layton, UT 84041 
801-336-3590 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
CONCLUSION 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) 10 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) 10 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1988) 3 
State v. Galvan, 2001 UTApp 329 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) 8 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991) 7 
State v. MacGuire, 84 P.3d 1171 (UT 2004) 7 
State v. Morrison, 31 P.3d 547 (UT 2001) 6 
State v. Williams 175 P.3d 1029 (UT 2007) 11 
Utah Code §41-6a-301 3,6,7,11,12 
Utah Code §72-6-114 4,5,6,11,12 
2 Clinton R. Drake (11155) 
Layton City Attorney's Office 
437 N. Wasatch Dr., Layton, UT 84041 
801-336-3590 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
Utah Code §77-23-102 9 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 7 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Defendant failed to state the standards of review for the four issues he 
presented. Therefore the City will offer its understanding of the appropriate 
standards of review. The present appeal is from a criminal bench trial. Accordin, 
this Court reviews the District Court's factual determinations under a clearly 
erroneous standard and legal determinations under a correctness standard. See 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930,933 (Utah 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
41-6a-304 Utah Code. Obeying devices -- Effect of improper 
position, illegibility, or absence -- Presumption of lawful 
placement and compliance with chapter. 
(1) Except as otherwise directed by a peace officer or other 
authorized personnel under Section 41-6a-209 and except as 
provided under Section 41-6a-212 for authorized emergency 
vehicles, the operator of a vehicle shall obey the instructions of 
any traffic-control device placed or held in accordance with this 
chapter. 
(2) (a) Any provision of this chapter, for which a traffic-control 
device is required, may not be enforced if at the time and place of 
the alleged violation the traffic-control device is not in proper 
position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily 
observant person. 
(b) The provisions of this chapter are effective independently 
of the placement of a traffic-control device unless the provision 
requires the placement of a traffic-control device prior to its 
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enforcement 
(3) A traffic-control device placed or held in a position 
approximately conforming to the requirements of this chapter is 
presumed to have been placed or held by the official act or 
direction of a highway authority or other lawful authority, unless 
the contrary is established by competent evidence. 
(4) A traffic-control device placed or held under this chapter 
and purporting to conform to the lawful requirements of the 
device is presumed to comply with the requirements of this 
chapter, unless the contrary is established by competent evidence. 
§ 72-6-114 Utah Code. Restricting use of or closing highway -
Penalty for failure to observe barricade, warning light, etc. 
(1) A highway authority may close or restrict travel on a 
highway under their jurisdiction due to construction, 
maintenance work, or emergency. 
(2) If a highway or portion of a highway is closed or restricted 
to travel, a highway authority shall cause suitable barriers and 
notices to be posted and maintained in accordance with Section 
41-6a-301. 
(3) A person who willfully fails to observe any barricade, 
warning light, sign, or flagman, used in accordance with this 
section, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant's "Statement of Facts" wholly lacks citations to the record and 
assumes facts that are not in the record. Defendant's "Statement of Facts" includes 
portions described from his point of view; however such facts are not in the record 
as the Defendant declined to testify and did not present any evidence at trial. 
(45:16-22) 
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On April 18, 2008, the 2200 West to 3200 West portion of Gentile Street in Layton 
City, Utah was closed due to road construction. (7:15-24) The road was closed 
pursuant to applicable laws and regulations through the use of barricades and signs. 
(9:23-38:18-41:13) Residents living within the closed portion of the road were 
issued permits by the City through the construction contractor. (9:13-17) The 
permits were issued for the purpose of allowing police officers and construction 
workers to easily identify drivers that resided within the area. (9:13-17) Officer 
Jordan Jeppson of the Layton City Police Department observed the Defendant 
driving within the closed portion of Gentile Street without a permit. (9:11-17) 
Officer Jeppson stopped the Defendant and issued him a citation for driving on a 
closed road. (7:7-11) 
On August 25, 2008 the Defendant was charged by criminal information in the 
Second District Court, Layton Department with "Restricted Use of a Closed 
Highway", Utah Code §72-6-114. On the same date a bench trial was conducted in 
which the Defendant was found guilty of violating §72-6-114 UCA. (64:17-18 and 
67:20-68:13) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Utah Code §72-6-114 is not unconstitutionally vague because it is clear what the 
statute as a whole prohibits. 
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2. The Defendant failed to file a motion to suppress and therefore is precluded from 
making a claim to suppress. 
3. The Officer's traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion that a traffic 
violation was being committed and not as part of an administrative checkpoint. 
4. The prosecutor did not violate the Defendants rights or the Shondel Doctrine by 
offering a plea bargain. 
ARGUMENT 
Argument 1 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §72-6-114 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS 
THE BARRIERS AND SIGNS CLEARLY INDICATED THE ROAD WAS CLOSED. 
In reviewing statutes for vagueness, a court will presume "that the statute is valid, 
and... resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. 
Morrison, 31 P.3d 547 (UT 2001). Barricades were placed in directly in the roads. 
Signs were placed on the barricades that clearly indicated the road was closed and 
access was limited to "local traffic only". All barricades and signs on and near the 
closed road conformed to all applicable laws and regulations. (10:6-11:11) 
Specifically, Utah Code §72-6-114(2) requires that all barriers and notices must be 
posted and maintained pursuant to Utah Code §41-6a-301, which states that the 
standards and specifications shall "correlate with, and where possible conform to, 
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the system set forth in the most recent edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices for Streets and Highways"". Layton City Civil Traffic Engineer Alan 
Moss testified that the barriers and notices placed at or near the closed road 
conformed to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices as required by the 
statute. See Utah Code §41-6a-301 and (39:3-25). It is not enough for a defendant 
to simply "inject doubt as to the meaning of words where no doubt would be felt by 
the normal reader." State v. MacGuire, 84 P.3d 1171 (UT 2004). 
The District Court appropriately noted that "where there is no specific statutory 
definition of words, the Court is required to interpret the laws just according to the 
common an ordinary meaning and usage of the words." (65:10-18) The District 
Court correctly used the common usage of "Local Traffic Only" when it ruled that 
Defendant, a resident of a neighboring City was not "local traffic". See Groyned v. 
City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,110, (1972) (A statute may be marked by flexibility 
and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity so long as the statute is 
clear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits.); See also Greenwood v. City of North 
Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991). 
Argument 2 
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THE DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED FROM MAKING AN APPEAL TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE THIS 
ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 
The Defendant argues that evidence of the traffic stop should be suppressed because 
Officer Jeppsen lacked reasonable suspicion for making the stop. The Defendant is 
precluded from presenting the issue of suppression of evidence because pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d), the Defendant failed to make a motion to 
suppress to the district court. See also Ut. R. Crim. Pro. 12(f) ("Failure of the 
defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be 
made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but 
the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.") 
Notwithstanding the Defendant's failure to preserve any suppression issues for 
appeal. Officer Jeppsen lawfully stopped Defendant's vehicle because he had 
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was committing a traffic offense. See State 
v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329 (Utah Ct App. 2001)("A law enforcement officer may 
stop a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable suspicion the vehicle is being operated 
in violation of the law.") In the present case, the road was clearly and lawfully 
barricaded and marked. (10:6-23) (39:3-25). Permits were issued to drivers that 
lived within the closed portion of the road. (9:11-17). Officer Jeppsen observed The 
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Defendant driving within the closed road without a permit. (9:11-17). Officer 
Jeppsen had reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was operating his vehicle in 
violation of the law because the Defendant did not have a permit. (9:11-13) 
Furthermore, Defendant, although not under oath, admitted in his closing argument 
that he was knowingly "driving in the closed area of - - beyond the barricaded area". 
(49:15-17). 
Based on fact that the Defendant failed to make a motion to suppress, the Defendant 
waived any right to argue that evidence should have been suppressed. Additionally, 
the record supports that Officer Jeppsen had a reasonable and individualized 
suspicion that the Defendant was committing a traffic offense and as such the 
District Court's ruling was correct 
Argument 3 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE TRAFFIC STOP 
INITIATED BY OFFICER JEPPSEN WAS NOT AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
STOP BECAUSE THE STOP RESULTED FROM HIS ARTICULATED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TFIAT THE DEFENDANT WAS COMMITTING A TRAFFIC OFFENSE. 
The Layton City Police Officers' actions on the date in question did not amount to an 
administrative checkpoint. Utah Code §77-23-102 specifically defines an 
"administrative traffic checkpoint" as a "roadblock procedure where enforcement 
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officers stop all, or a designated sequence of, motor vehicles traveling on highways 
and roads and subject those vehicles to inspection or testing and the drivers or 
occupants to questioning or the production of documents." (emphasis added). The 
Layton Officers were not stopping all vehicles, nor were they stopping a designated 
sequence of vehicles. (24:15-17). Rather, Layton Police Officers were only stopping 
vehicles for which they had reasonable suspicion to stop because they did not 
display a permit to travel in the closed area. (24:15-17). 
Based on the forgoing information the record clearly supports the District Court's 
determination that the traffic stop was not an administrative checkpoint stop. 
Argument 4 
THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT VIOLATE THE SHONDEL DOCTRINE BECAUSE THE 
TWO STATUTES ARE NOT IDENTICAL. 
The prosecutor's actions in this matter were nothing more than an offer for a plea 
bargain to plead to a lesser offense. The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized plea bargaining as both an essential and desirable part of the criminal 
justice system. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). A plea bargain 
to plead to seperate offense with a less severe punishment does not violate the 
equal protection and the uniform application of laws doctrine of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
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The Shondel Doctrine does not apply because the two statutes are not identical. See 
State v. Williams 175 P.3d 1029 (UT 2007) (The Shondel Doctrine does not apply if 
two statutes do not fully overlap, i.e. the elements are identical.) Shondel only 
applies when "two statutes are wholly duplicative as to the elements of a crime/' 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). The statutes in 
question are Utah Code §41-6a-304 "Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device" and 
Utah Code §72-6-114 "Driving on a Closed Road". They are not wholly duplicative. 
They do not have identical elements and they have very different penalties, the 
former with a recommended bail amount of under $100.00 and the latter with a 
recommended bail amount in excess of $500.00. Of particular interest in this matter 
is the distinction that Utah Code §41-6a-304 carries a presumption that a traffic-
control device is lawful while Utah Code §72-6-114 places a heavier burden on the 
prosecution to prove that a highway is closed lawfully and that the barriers and/or 
signs are posted in accordance with applicable law. This is important to note 
because an offer was made by the prosecution to unconditionally amend the charge 
to Utah Code §41-6a-304 "Failure to Obey Traffic Control Device" rather than Utah 
Code §72-6-114 "Driving on Closed Road". (61:11-25) The Defendant refused to 
accept this unconditional offer to amend, presumably because "Driving On Closed 
Road" carries a heavier burden of proof because there is no presumption that a 
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traffic-control device conforms to lawful requirements. See Utah Code §41-6a-
304(4). 
Because the two statutes are not "wholly duplicative" as required by the Shondel 
Doctrine and that an offer to amend the charge without condition was made by the 
Prosecutor but declined by the Defendant, the District Court correctly ruled that the 
Defendant's rights were not violated. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's decisions were correct in all respects and for the reasons more 
fully set forth above, Plaintiff and Appellee respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the conviction of Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON R. DRAKE (11155) 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE 
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